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Moral thinking has two central features.  Our judgments appear to be more or less accurate 
and they also seem action-guiding.  This collection of new articles focuses on one of the most 
important metaethical debates about the second, practical aspect of moral thought.  
 
This debate has come to be known as the judgment internalism debate.  At its heart is the 
question of how we should explain the process through which our moral judgments lead us to 
act.  Imagine that Laura comes to learn about the climate change and as a consequence judges 
that it would be wrong for her to emit greenhouse gases.  After this judgment, we would 
expect Laura to have at least some motivation to avoid making additional emissions.  The 
question is: why would Laura have such motivation? 
 
According to internalists, Laura acquires the new desire not to emit because there is an 
internal connection between moral judgments and motivation.  Either moral judgments 
themselves are desire-like attitudes (i.e., states of motivatedness) or they have a direct power 
to produce desires in people at least insofar as they are rational.  On these views, motivation 
thus has to follow from the judgment, which explains Laura’s new desire.  In contrast, 
according to the externalists, Laura’s moral judgment will lead to a desire not to emit only if 
she, for instance, has a distinct standing desire to acquire desires to do what she thinks is 
right.  Whether Laura has this desire is a contingent fact about her – it is external to her moral 
judgment itself and also something Laura need not have in virtue of her rationality.  At the 
heart of this debate is then the question of which one of these explanations is more plausible. 
 
The editors of this collection have brought together an excellent set of philosophers to 
address the previous question.  Roughly one half of the contributors are leading senior 
metaethicists who have already made important contributions to this debate whereas the rest 
are younger scholars who were selected through an open call for abstracts.  The editors have 
also provided a helpful overview article and arranged the articles of the volume clearly under 
three distinct headings. 
 
The articles of the first part address the arguments for and against internalism.  Michael 
Smith investigates whether we can argue from the judgment-sensitive nature of desires and 
the so-called buck-passing theories of desirability to judgment internalism and concludes that 
such arguments are unlikely to work.  Nick Zangwill argues that internalism fails to explain 
how the strength of our commitment to morality can vary even if we are instrumentally 
rational.  Jesse Prinz claims that we should understand moral judgments as a natural kind.  He 
then introduces a body of empirical evidence to suggest that motivation is a constitutive 
element of moral judgments because such judgments consist of emotional attitudes.  In 
contrast, Daniel Eggers argues that the standard externalist thought-experiments involving 
various amoralist characters fail to rule out internalism because that thesis requires only that 
agents who make moral judgments have some motivation.  He then claims that, once we 
design the thought-experiments more carefully to detect motivation, internalism will be 
vindicated.  Finally, on the basis of empirical studies of psychopathy, Jeanette Kennett 
describes the role which the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance must play in the way we 
become motivated on the basis of our moral principles. She also thinks that being moved by 
cognitive dissonance is constitutive of the acceptance of moral principles, which according to 
her suggests that internalism is true.  
 
The articles of the second part explore the metaethical consequences of the internalism 
debate.  Michael Ridge argues that the most plausible version of internalism supports hybrid 
theories of normative judgments according to which such judgments consist of both desire-
like attitudes and beliefs.  Teemu Toppinen tries to show that traditional first-order 
expressivist views can both accommodate internalism and leave room for weakness of will, 
whereas more complicated second-order views fail to explain the irrationality of weakness of 
will.  James Dreier explains how the so-called Normative Question objection to non-
naturalist forms of metaethical realism should be understood as the charge that these views 
are unable to explain why it is irrational to fail to be motivated by one’s normative 
judgments.  And, Jon Tresan claims that we can explain the truth of internalism by 
considering the functional role which moral concepts play in our moral practices.  He then 
argues that this explanation is compatible with the view that moral concepts just represent the 
natural features of the world and even with theories according to which different groups 
employ concepts with different contents.  
 
Finally, the last part of the book investigates different forms of internalism and externalism 
and especially how sophisticated externalist views can accommodate internalist data, and vice 
versa.  Sigrún Svavarsdóttir defends externalism by arguing that, because we come to learn 
what is good through valuing things, it is no surprise that we tend to want what we judge to 
be good.  According to Antti Kauppinen’s interesting proposal both internalists and 
externalists are right about something.  He argues that internalists are right about moral 
intuitions whereas externalists are right about our moral beliefs.  The former attitudes include 
motivatedness whereas the latter can fail to motivate us either when we fail to fully grasp 
their content or when we lack a conscientious desire.  In contrast, Kate Manne introduces a 
new tempered form of internalism according to which moral judgments of an agent motivate 
her when she takes responsibility of her own agency whereas they can fail to motivate when 
she becomes a spectator of her own behaviour. Finally, in the last article of the collection, 
John Mumm argues that the amoralists are able to use moral language sincerely to keep track 
of the standard evaluations of the community even if we would not count their judgments to 
be genuine in another sense. This is because the amoralists’ judgments fail to satisfy the 
function which moral judgments are meant to serve in the process of co-deliberation.    
 
I can recommend this collection wholeheartedly to everyone who is interested in the 
judgment internalism debate.  I can also recommend many individual articles to those 
metaethicists who are working on other important questions in metaethics and moral 
psychology.  My only slight criticism of the volume is that many of the authors have 
unfortunately decided to play it safe.  As many of the authors note, this debate has reached a 
standoff where the main positions are well-known and the main arguments for them have 
been exhausted.  In this situation, little progress will be made by going through the earlier 
arguments again or by considering their finer details and additional side-effects.  I would 
have preferred that more new unexplored terrain would have been opened for exploration 
with new bold arguments, but here not many authors attempted to do so.   
 
The editors should, however, be thanked for bringing together for the first time the leading 
research on one of the most important metaethical questions.  Hopefully their efforts will 
create further interest in this debate.  In addition to this collection, we would also badly need 
a collection of the most important previously published articles on the topic and a thorough 
book-length unified treatment of the debate.  I can only hope that reading this collection will 
inspire the next generation to complete these projects too.  
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